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MINIMAL CONSEQUENCE IN SENTENTIAL LOGIC 
MARY-ANGELA PAPALASKARI AND SCOTT WEINSTEIN 
D We define minimal consequence in sentential logic and present a number of 
results of a model-theoretic and recursion-theoretic haracter about this 
newly introduced nonmonotonic consequence relation. We show that the 
minimal consequence relation is not compact and is lT: and not 2;. We 
also connect this relation to questions about the completion of theories by 
“negation as failure”. We give a complete characterization of the class of 
theories in sentential ogic which can be consistently completed by “nega- 
tion as failure” using the newly introduced notion of a subconditional 
theory. We show that the class of theories consistently completable by 
negation as failure is II! and not 2;. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The simplicity of sentential logic makes for a transparent exposition of many 
interesting aspects of the model theory and formalization of minimal consequence. 
On the other hand, sentential ogic already contains enough complexity so that 
many issues concerning important model-theoretic features of more interesting 
languages are raised. Significant aspects of minimal consequence can thus be 
articulated and studied in a clear and natural way, which illuminates their develop- 
ment for more sophisticated languages. Moreover, certain properties particular to 
sentential ogic, e.g., that there is a decision procedure for validity, will reflect on 
aspects of minimal consequence. As we will see, the minimal consequences of a 
consistent theory are always consistent. 
The minimal consequences of a theory are defined in terms of truth in all 
minimal models of the theory and, as such, extend the set of semantic onsequences 
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of the theory by some consistent set of sentences. In the case where an incomplete 
theory has a unique minimal model, its minimal consequences will be complete. 
We begin by fixing notation, in Section 2. Section 3 gives the definitions of 
minimal model and minimal consequence, following those with examples that 
illustrate some of the key features of these notions. Section 4 contains an exposition 
of the central model-theoretic properties of minimal consequence, namely minimal 
satisfiability of satisfiable theories and noncompactness. In Section 5 we undertake a 
study of some interesting fragments: here we define subconditional theories and 
compare them with conditional (or Horn) theories; since this is of great computa- 
tional import with regard to the consistent application of negation as failure, we 
offer a syntactic characterization of the class of subconditional theories and show 
that they are the largest class of theories that remain consistent under the applica- 
tion of negation as failure. Section 6 deals with complexity-theoretic aspects of 
minimal consequence and subconditional theories; we show that the minimal 
consequence relation is II! and not 2: and that even in the case of theories with 
unique minimal models it is A\ and neither r.e. or co-r.e., while the question of 
determining whether a theory has a unique minimal model is also II! and not 2:. 
The notion of minimal consequence studied here in the context of sentential logic 
is related to the notion of circumscription which arises in the study of nonmono- 
tonic reasoning in first-order logic; see [4] for results on the complexity of minimal 
consequence and minimal satisfiability in first-order logic. 
2. NOTATION 
A language 9 of sentential logic is a set of sentence letters and sentences built up 
from them using the usual sentential connectives. Given a set S of sentence letters, 
we can define a language for sentential logic as the smallest set _.Y such that S c 9; 
if + ~9, then (7+) ~9; if @ET and #EP’, then $J A 4 ~9. We will use the 
term atom to refer to sentence letters and the term basic formula to refer to atoms 
and their negations. For convenience, as is usual, the symbols “ V “, “ -+ ” and “ c) ” 
are introduced as abbreviations. Note that the language 9 is uniquely determined 
by the set S, and is of the same cardinality as S (if S is infinite), so from now on a 
language will be given as its set of atoms. The symbols p, q, r, s (possibly 
subscripted) will be used to denote distinct atoms of S. For a countable language, 
the atoms will typically be denoted by pi, p2,. . . , although in some cases, for 
reasons of clarity of exposition, a number of additional symbols will be used, again 
with the assumption that distinct symbols denote distinct atoms of the language. 
Boldfaced versions of these symbols ( p, q, r, s) will be used where it is necessary to 
have a symbol ranging over the atoms of the language. 
A structure for a language 9 is defined as a subset of S, so the set of structures 
for 9’ is of cardinality 2s; thus, the set of structures of any countably infinite 
language has the cardinal number of the continuum.’ 
We will assume that the reader is familiar with the definitions of a model of a 
sentence or a theory, satisfaction, and semantic consequence, as well as various 
‘We use the symbol w to denote the set of finite ordinals, i.e., natural numbers. Hence o is the least 
infinite ordinal and the smallest infinite cardinal, since we identify cardinals with initial ordinals. 
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results concerning these (see, e.g., [l, Section 1.21). By a theory is meant any set of 
well-formed formulas of the language (not necessarily closed under semantic conse- 
quence). We will use the symbols A, JV (possibly subscripted) for structures, and 
uppercase Greek letters for theories. For a consequence relation I=~ , let Cn,(I) = 
{$I 1 r !=,$}. We say that I=~ is monotonic iff VI’VA(r c A * Cn,(r) c Cn,(A)). 
Note that the classical consequence relation, t= , is monotonic. 
3. MINIMAL CONSEQUENCE IN SENTENTIAL LOGIC 
We begin by defining the notions of minimal model and minimal consequence. 
Dejkition 3. I. A I=,,, r (A is a minimal model of r) iff _M t= I and VM( JV~ I 
“4%.X). 
DeJinition 3.2. r !=,,, C#B (+ is a minimal consequence of r) iff V.M(dl=,,, I 
Ml= $). 
Thus, a model A of a theory is minimal if the theory has no models that are 
proper submodels of M, and a sentence (p is a minimal consequence of a theory I 
(or I minimally entails +) if + is true in all minimal models of I’. Note that the 
symbol “ t=,,, ” is used both as a relation between models and theories and as a 
relation between theories and sentences, but no confusion should arise, since the 
meaning will always be clear from the context. The following examples illustrate 
some interesting features of minimal consequence. In each of them it is assumed 
that I is a theory in a countable language. 
Example 3.1. Let I = 8. The set of models of I’ is 9(S), and so B is the unique 
minimal model for I. Thus I i=,,, 7p1 A . . - A -p,, for pi E S, 1 I i s n. The 
theory ru{p,A --. A p, } has a unique minimal model also, namely { pi 11 I i I 
n},so rU{plA --- ~p,}~~,p,~ --- A,P,. 
We immediately see from this simple example that the relation I=~ is nonmono- 
tonic. 
Example 3.2. Let I’= { pzi VP,,+~ Ii E w}. Every model of I must contain 
either pzi or pzi+,, or both, for each i E o. The minimal models of l? will be the 
ones that contain exactly one of pzi or p2i+l. So the set of minimal models of I is 
of cardinality 2”, i.e., the cardinal number of the continuum. 
These examples depict two extreme cases: Cn,(I’) in Example 3.1 is complete, 
whereas Cn,( I) in Example 3.2 has continuum many models. The following 
example illustrates yet a different aspect of minimal consequence, namely a theory I’ 
such that Cn,( I’) = Cn( I). 
Example 3.3. Let r = { pi V pi 1 i, j E w, i Zj}. Then I has sentences of the form 
~PO+Plr~Po-,P2r..., and 7pi+po,Tpi+p1 ,..., 7po+pj ,..., for j#i, so in 
any model .M of I, if pi 44, then for all j # i, pi E AY. Thus the models of I are 
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those where at most one element is missing, and the minimal models of P are those 
where exactly one element is missing. 
The importance of this example lies in the fact that the set of structures 
8 = { _Mil pi e.Mi, pj EJ#~, i #j} cannot be characterized as the set of models of 
any theory, as can be shown by a straightforward application of the compactness 
theorem. Hence, there is no set of sentences Z such that the models of Z are exactly 
the minimal models of l?. 
Although there are sets of structures that cannot be characterized as the models 
of any theory, but that can be characterized as the set of minimal models of some 
theory, there are also sets of structures which cannot be characterized as the 
minimal models of any theory. Trivially, any set that contains structures M and JV 
with J#C JV is such a set. The question now arises whether there are sets that do 
not contain any two structures such that one includes the other (in this sense, 
incomparable structures), and which cannot be characterized as the set of minimal 
models of any theory. The answer to this question is necessarily positive, because 
the number of theories in a countably infinite language is of cardinality 2”, while 
there are 2’- sets of pairwise incomparable structures. 
A specific example of a collection of structures (in fact, a countable collection) 
that cannot be characterized as the set of minimal models of any theory is the set 
%’ = { { pi} 1 i E o}. As was the case with the minimal models of the theory in 
Example 3.3, any theory that is satisfied by all &E 8 will also be satisfied by the 
empty model (again, by compactness); but in this case, the empty model will be the 
unique minimal model of that theory. 
4. MINIMAL SATISFIABILITY AND COMPACTNESS 
Due to the simplicity of sentential logic, the intersection of every chain of submod- 
els of a theory will be a model of the theory, and thus every satisfiable theory is 
minimally satisjable, i.e., has a minimal model. This is the content of Proposi- 
tion 4.1. 
Proposition 4.1. Every satisjiable theory is minimally satisfiable. 
PROOF. It suffices to show that any maximal chain of models of a theory (ordered 
by the submodel relation) will contain a minimum element. This is immediate from 
Zorn’s lemma and the fact that the intersection of a chain of models of a theory is a 
model of the theory. 0 
Corollary 4.1. Minimal satisjiability is compact. 
PROOF. Immediate from the proposition and the compactness of satisfiability in 
sentential ogic. 0 
Proposition 4.1 is of relevance with respect to some of the intended applications 
of minimal consequence, where, in general, it is crucial that any sentences added to 
the consequences of a theory preserve consistency. However, minimal satisfiability 
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of satisfiable theories is not retained in the usual notions of minimal consequence 
for first-order languages [2]. 
Corollary 4.1 suggests that minimal consequence bears a strong similarity to 
consequence in the ordinary sense and, in particular, that the minimal consequence 
relation may be compact. The two (equivalent) formulations of compactness for 
sentential logic are the following: 
(1) If I b $I then there exists a finite A c I’ such that A b $. (Compactness af 
semantic consequence.) 
(2) If every finite subset of I is satisfiable, then I is satisfiable. (Compactness of 
satisjability.) 
Clearly, these are equivalent, since I I= + iff I u {-,$a} is unsatisfiable. Notice 
also that, although they are equivalent in this case, it is the former that is viewed as 
an enabling condition for the existence of a complete logical calculus, since this 
requires finite proofs of sentences which are (semantic) consequences of some set of 
hypotheses. 
Due to nonmonotonicity phenomena, the above equivalence breaks down for 
minimal consequence, i.e., it is possible that I !=,,, +, although I’ u {+#B} is (minim- 
ally) satisfiable. (For example, fl b,,, 7p, but { p } clearly has a minimal model.) 
Thus the question whether it is at all possible to construct a complete logical 
calculus for minimal consequence is not settled by Corollary 4.1, and to this end it 
will be necessary to inquire whether, if a sentence is a minimal consequence of a 
theory, then it is a consequence of a finite subset of that theory. The answer to this 
question is no. 
Proposition 4.2. The minimal consequence relation is not compact, i.e., there is a set of 
sentences r and a sentence + such that (i) I b,,, +, and (ii) VA c I( A is finite =+ 
A km +). 
PROOF. Let I = l?i u I’,, where 
and 
r,= pzv 
( 
A pin>1 . 
35is2n I 1 
Note that I b,,, ( p1 -p2) A (pl vp3), but for all finite A c I, A w,,, ( p1 -p2) A 
( p1 v p3). This is because I has exactly two minimal models: one in which p1 and 
p2 are true and all other letters are false, and another where p1 and p2 are false and 
all other letters are true; both of these make ( p1 -p2) A ( p1 Vp3) true. On the 
other hand, any finite subset A of I will fail to minimally entail ( p1 - pz) A ( p1 v 
p3) for one of the following reasons: 
(1) A n Ii = 0, and thus A i#m p1 v p3. 
(2) AnI,=13,soAK:,pl~pz. 
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(3) There will be a largest m and a largest k such that the sentences pi V 
II~~~~,,,P~ and p2 V hjsiskpi will be in A; supposing m > k, A will then 
have exactly three minimal models: 
(a) 4 = {ply ~~1, 
(b)A2={~3>...,~m), 
(4 A, = { Pl, P37 P4,. f * 9 Pk 1, 
and p1 -p2 will fail to hold in A3. Similarly for the case where m -C k. 
(Note that, by the construction of the sentences in I, and I,, m = n is not 
possible.) 
We have exhibited a theory I and a sentence $J such that I’ k=m 9, but for no finite 
subset A of I does one have A !=,,, 9. Thus, the minimal consequence relation is not 
compact. 0 
The above result settles negatively the question of the existence of a finitary 
logical calculus for minimal consequence. Although the practical implications at this 
point may appear very grim, there are, as we see in the next section, fragments for 
which such a calculus is of demonstrated practical value. Moreover, the absence of 
compactness attests to a greater ichness of expression, a fact that is very relevant to 
the obvious need in AI for more powerful formalisms. 
5. UNIQUE MINIMAL MODELS 
The idea of adding the negations of every atom which is not provable is not a novel 
one; it has been studied extensively in computer science in connection with theorem 
proving for Horn clauses and logic programming, and is generally referred to as 
negation us failure. In general, negation as failure as applied to a consistent, 
incomplete theory results in an inconsistent theory. Consider, for example the 
theory I = {p V q}. r is consistent but I’ = I U {7p,7q} is inconsistent, al- 
though neither p nor q is a consequence of I. This motivates the search for a class 
of consistent theories that remain consistent under the application of negation as 
failure. A necessary and sufficient condition for consistent application of negation 
as failure to consistent heories is given in the following lemma. 
Lemma 5.1. Let r be a theory in a language 9. Then r U {-p 1 r ktp andp EL?} is 
consistent - I’ has a unique minimal model. 
PROOF. * : Let Peg= {-p 1 IT wp and PEZ}, and suppose that I u Peg is 
consistent. Let AI= I’ u Peg. Then A= {p 1 r !=p}. Hence, if JV~ I, then MC JV. 
Therefore, _.# is the unique minimal model of I. 
= : Suppose I has a unique minimal model 4. Then Peg = {7p 1 Jt I= r and 
.,#I= 7p and p E 9 }, so r U F is consistent. I2 
Thus, the class of theories that can be completed using negation as failure is 
exactly the class of theories with unique minimal models. Observe also that a theory 
I with a unique minimal model shows a form of completeness: for each sentence cp 
in the language of I’, either r t=m (p or r I= m 7~ (this fact follows directly from the 
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definition of minimal consequence). For this reason, theories that have a unique 
minimal model will be referred to as minimally complete. 
Definition 5.1. A theory is minimally complete iff it has a unique minimal model. 
As was noted above, minimally complete theories are significant to computer 
scientists via their connection with negation as failure, and therefore the question to 
be addressed next is their syntactic characterization. The first candidate class of 
minimally complete theories are conditional theories: 
Definition 5.2. Conditional theories (or Horn theories) are sets of sentences each of 
which is in one of the following forms: 
(1) P7 
(2) 141 v . . . v 14,, 
(3) 141 v . . . v 74, vp. 
Horn theories have been extensively studied in computer science, and it is a 
well-known result that they remain consistent under negation as failure. Apart from 
the interest they offer in connection with negation as failure, conditional theories 
have been an object of study in model theory because they exhibit a preservation 
property for model intersections. A theory is said to preserve intersections iff for 
any set of its models, their intersection is also a model. A converse of the above is 
also true, namely, every theory that preserves intersections is equivalent to a 
conditional theory. Clearly, a theory that preserves intersections must have a unique 
minimal model. Thus conditional theories provide a partial characterization of the 
class of minimally complete theories and therefore, by Lemma 5.1, of the class of 
theories where negation as failure can be consistently applied. The converse, 
however is not true: it is possible for a theory to be minimally complete without 
preserving intersections. This is clear from the following trivial example. Let 
r = {-p V q V r } ; r has a unique minimal model, namely the empty set, but it also 
has the models { p, q } and { p, r }, whose intersection is not a model of r. Of 
course, I’ is not a conditional theory either, but r can be consistently completed via 
negation as failure in this case, since it is minimally complete. Examples such as this 
suggest a weaker preservation property for minimally complete theories, namely that 
the intersection of a set of models of the theory contains a model of the theory, and 
motivate the following definition: 
Dejinition 5.3. A theory r is subconditional iff every sentence of r is in one of the 
following forms: 
(1) P,, REI, Ico, 
(2) v 8lEFP?lV V”GKPW JGW, Kcw, Jand K finite, and J$I. 
In intuitive terms, a subconditional theory consists of a set of atoms and a set of 
disjunctions; each of the disjunctions contains at least one negated sentence letter 
which does not appear elsewhere in isolation. The theory mentioned above is a 
subconditional theory. Another simple example is the theory { p4, p,, 7p1 Vp, V 
P397P2V 7P4VP3VP7L 
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The aim of this section is to provide a complete characterization of minimally 
complete theories. We will proceed by showing that the class of subconditional 
theories contains exactly those theories that are equivalent to some minimally 
complete theory. As was suggested earlier, conditional theories fail in this respect 
due to a slightly stronger preservation property. The preservation property required 
for minimally complete theories is given in Lemma 5.2 below. 
Lemma 5.2. A consistent theory r is minimally complete w for every set of models of 
r, their intersection contains a model of r. 
PROOF. - : Let I be a minimally complete theory, and let &!* be the unique 
minimal model of I. Since .M* is minimal, it is contained in every model of I, and 
thus, in the intersection of any set of models of I. 
= : Let I’ be a consistent theory, and suppose the intersection of any set of 
models of I contains a model of I’. If X and X are minimal models of I, then 
their intersection will contain a model M* of I, but since M and X are minimal, 
JY=Y=JP. 0 
Although Lemma 5.2 is useful in emphasizing the distinction between minimally 
complete theories (which preserve a submodel of intersections) and conditional 
theories (which preserve all intersections), rather than showing that subconditional 
theories have the desired preservation property, we will directly show that subcondi- 
tional theories are the desired characterization and thus obtain the preservation 
property as a corollary. 
Proposition 5.1. A theory r is minimally complete = r is equivalent to a subcondi- 
tional theory. 
PROOF. - : Suppose I has a unique minimal model J?. Let 
I= {nJpnEJ), 
rp = {pnln E I}, 
r” = { +Ic$ is the conjunctive normal form of J/ and J, E I?} . 
Thus, 
rn= V -pnv V p,iEo 
i nq PICK, I ) 
for some sequence of sets Ji and Ki. Note that IJ’ u I? is equivalent to I. 
Let I?= {VneJ,_17pn v V,,,p. 1 i E a}. Then IYpu I”- is equivalent to rJ’ 
UP andthereforeto I’(forqEJl.nI, {p,,V,,,,p, vV,,,p,,} isequivalent to 
{ PJ “cJ,-(4)~PnVV”~K,Pn}). 
Let rn’ = {VncJi-17~n v V,,, p,,lie:w and J,-Zzfl}. Then IPUP* is a 
subconditional theory, so now it suffices to show that I?P U I’“’ is equivalent to 
rp u r”. NOW rn’ c rn, SO vh+vk rp u rn- j J-I= rp u P). Let 9 E r”-- 
P. Then + = V n E Ki p,, for some i. Now, since rp u I’“- is equivalent to I’, _M is a 
model of $, so Ki n I f PI, and therefore $I contains a (positive) literal already in I’P. 
Hence I’p u I”* t= 9. Therefore, VC#J E I’“-( rp u I’“’ I= (p), so l?p u I’“’ is equivalent 
t0 rp u rn-. 
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e= : Suppose I is equivalent to some subconditional theory I*. Let JY= { pi 1 pi 
E I?*}. Clearly, JZ satisfies every positive sentence in I*. Let + = V,,,,p, V 
V nEK,pn E r*. By the definition of subconditional theories, + contains a negative 
literal , pi such that pi G _M, so _M I= I#J. Jl is minimal, since for any J+‘C JZ there is 
a pi E r* such that N?#p,. 0 
Corollary 5.1 (Preservation theorem for subconditional theories). A theory r is equiva- 
lent to a subconditional theory if for every set of models of r, their intersection 
contains a model of r. 
PROOF. Immediate, by Lemma 5.2. 0 
In Section 6.2 we will compute the complexity of determining whether a theory is 
minimally complete (and, hence, the complexity of determining whether it is 
equivalent to a subconditional theory). 
6. COMPLEXITY 
So far we have encountered various properties of minimal consequence for senten- 
tial logic that indicate that 
(1) minimal consequence cannot be formalised in the usual sense; 
(2) the class of subconditional theories, which have a relatively simple set of 
theorems, cannot be defined in computationally simple terms. 
It is the aim of this section to make the above observations precise by means of 
complexity considerations. For a countable theory I and a sentence + in the 
language of I’, we will consider the complexity of the following questions: 
(1) It=,+? 
(2) Is r minimally complete? 
(3) r km +? for r minimally complete. 
The equivalent questions for semantic consequence in ordinary sentential logic 
are r.e., II!, and recursive, respectively. For minimal consequence, as we will see, 
the complexity of these questions will be II: (and not Zs), II: (and not Zz), and 
A; (and neither 2: nor II,“), respectively. Recall that Cn,( I) denotes { cp 1 r F,,, G}. 
6.1. Complexity of the Minimal Consequence Relation 
The failure of compactness for minimal consequence indicates that the minimal 
consequences of a theory r may not be recursively enumerable in I. The aim of this 
section is to show that, in fact, the minimal consequence relation is II! and not Zj’. 
Indeed, we will exhibit a recursive theory I such that Cn,(F) is III-complete. It is 
assumed that the reader has some familiarity with the basics of recursive function 
theory and techniques for determinin g upper and lower bounds on complexity of 
relations. Sufficient background (and more) may be gained from the first three 
chapters of [3]. 
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From the definition of minimal consequence we can obtain the first, very loose, 
upper bound; recall that 
I-t=,+ 0 vJ+#l=,r * A&#), 
Mb, r 0 A!= l7 and VN(M= r =+. &ZJ%). 
Since Mi= r is an arithmetical relation, it follows immediately that !=,,, is a II: 
relation, i.e., is definable by an V3 formula with the quantifiers ranging over sets. 
The strict II: upper bound will be obtained by showing that I=~ is definable by an 
V3 formula with the quantifiers ranging over numbers, in Proposition 6.2. Lower 
bounds will be established via many-one reduction of sets of known complexity: 
Proposition 6.1 gives the strict lower bound: II!. 
As a prelude to our sharper esults on lower bounds, observe that it is a corollary 
of Proposition 4.2, the noncompactness of I=~ , that !=,,, is not a ZF relation, i.e., 
!=‘m is not an r.e. relation on “2 x w. This follows directly from the fact that all ZF 
relations on “2 x w are open with respect to the product topology on “2 x w, when 
“2 is given the usual product (Cantor set) topology. In this connection, note that 
Proposition 4.2 shows that {C E “2 1 Z I=,,, ( p1 * pz) A ( p1 V p3)} is not open. 
The following propositions serve to locate the minimal consequence relation in 
the arithmetical hierarchy. We will use the notation [p], where [p]’ =p and 
[PI “+l= ([PI” A p); ( n, m) will be used to denote an encoding of the ordered pair 
(n, m) (( , ) is a recursive bijection between w x w and w ). 
Proposition 6.1. There is a recursive set of sentences r such that Cn,( l’) is @-hard. 
PROOF. Let X= {n lVxYyR(n, x, y)}, R is a recursive relation, be a complete II(: 
set of numbers. We show how to construct a recursive set of sentences r such that 
X is m-reducible to Cn,(r). 
Let {p.In~+J{q~,,.~l n, x E w } be a set of pairwise distinct sentence letters. 
Let r = {P. v q+) I n9 x E 4 u U4in,xjl I Y R n, x, y)}. Note that (1) for each ( 
n, x E Q, r t=, 4(n,x) iff 3yR(n, x, y), and (2) l? I=,,, -p, iff for each x, r i= q(_). 
Hence, n E X = r l==m -p,. 0 
Corollary 6.1. k:m is not a Zt relation on “2 X w. 
PROOF. The corollary follows directly from Proposition 6.1. Cl 
The next proposition establishes that the lower bound on the complexity of the 
minimal consequence relation given in Corollary 6.1 is the best possible. 
Proposition 6.2. I=,,, is a II(: relation on “2 X w. 
PROOF. The proof proceeds by showing that l? t#,,, $I is a Zq relation, from which it 
follows that the relation “ t=, ” is II!. Note that r Km + is equivalent o 
!U(_Mb, l? and M# $J). (1) 
Let Con(r) e r I# p A 7p (i.e., r is a consistent heory). Con is a II; predicate. 
It suffices then to show that (1) is equivalent o 
3A(A isfinite&Con(ruA)&Kon(Au {$}) 
&Vi(p,EA a -Con(ru A-u {-pi)))), (2) 
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where A-= {_p IYp E A}. [Note that Vi is a bounded quantifier and hence that (2) 
defines a Zq relation on “2 X w.] 
(1) 3 (2): Let it4 = {p 1 p EM} U (-p 1 p GA}. Observe that 
A#+ - jAcM(A finite&-Xon(AU {+})) (3) 
and 
Ml=, r * VAcM(Con(rUA)&Vi(p,EA - -,Con(I’UM-U{,p,}))) 
- tlhGM(Con(rUA) &Vi(p,EA 
- 32M,iGMP(Zw,i finite&-Xon(rUZ,,,u {-p,})))) 
(by compactness) 
- VAcM Con(TuA)&Vi P,EA 
i ( 
- 32 M,l c M- IS,,, finite & Xon r u 
i ( 
u %,2J LPJ 
{;IP,EA) 
- VAzM3Z(Z finite&Con(I’uA) 
&Vi(p,EA - ,Con(r uZu {-pI}))). 
From (3),(4) with (1) we obtain (2). 
(2) - (1): Suppose (2), and let A be such that 
A isfinite&Con(I’uA)&,Con(Au (+}) 
&Vi(p,EA - Xon(T uA-u{7p,})) 
Note that for all A’ 
-Con( A’U {(p}) * V_,H(.Mt=A’ - _I&!#+) 
and 
Con( r u A’) - 3&Y+&=, r u A'). 
From (5) (6), and (7) it follows that 
3J+m=,ruA&~#~). 
Now, it suffices to show that 
Jll=:,r+uA a _k,r, 
since (1) follows immediately from (8) and (9). 
Suppose Ml==, r U A and 3Jlrc JH(JV~, r). From this we have that 
3~cd(~!=ruA-&M!#ruA). 
so 
3i(p,EA &Con(ruA-u{,p,})), 
which contradicts (5). q 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
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6.2. Complexity of the Minimal Completeness Property 
In a computational setting it is necessary to have a way of determining whether, 
given an arbitrary theory, it is minimally complete, in a straightforward and 
mechanical fashion. Of course, one such method is suggested by the construction in 
the proof of Proposition 5.1, which involves checking whether the theory is equiva- 
lent to a subconditional theory, but this requires that the entire theory be taken into 
consideration, even in the case where only one new sentence is being added to a 
minimally complete theory. Thus the characterization of minimally complete theo- 
ries in terms of subconditional theories seems lacking. In light of complexity 
considerations, however, we will see that the perceived defects of a characterization 
based on subconditional theories stem from the intrinsic complexity of the problem 
of deciding minimal completeness. 
Proposition 6.3. The set MC of minima& complete theories is II! and not Z!. 
PROOF. For any theory I we have that 
IEMC = V+(Ibm+ or It=, 7+). (10) 
It follows from (10) and Proposition 6.2 that MC is II:, and it follows from (the 
proof of) Proposition 6.1 that MC is not Zq. 0 
In order to assess the usefulness of minimal completeness it is necessary to 
consider a further question: what is the complexity of minimal consequence for 
minimally complete theories? Consider the case of a pure conditional theory or a 
recursive set of sentences which is known to be minimally complete; does this 
knowledge affect the complexity of deciding minimal consequence, which as we have 
seen is IIt and not Zq? The answer to this question is negative, as one might 
suspect by inspecting the proof of Proposition 5.1; notice that the construction in 
that proof assumes that the theory l? has a unique minimal model, corresponding 
exactly to the atomic consequences of I, but the difficulty in generating the model 
from an arbitrary minimally complete set of sentences is apparent. 
Proposition 6.4. For minimally complete theories, minimal consequence is A\ and 
neither 2: nor II:. 
PROOF. In a minimally complete theory I 
v+(=,+ a rk, 4. (11) 
So minimal consequence is A: for minimally complete theories. Suppose it is either 
IIF or EF. From (11) we obtain that it is in fact both, so we have that it is A:. Let 
I = (1 pelk I T(e, e, Q). ’ Note that I is a recursive set of sentences and it is 
minimally complete. We now have that 
rkmpe - eEK 
and thus a decision procedure for K, which is a contradiction. 0 
‘Recall that T is the Kleene T-predicate and K= {e IilxT(e, e, x)} (i.e., K encodes the halting 
problem). 
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Having motivated the study of minimally complete theories by computational 
considerations, it is natural to ask what bearing these results have on computational 
problems, since they were generally obtained in connection with infinite theories. 
This question can be confronted at two levels. First, in the semantics of logic 
programming, one is often led to consider the set of ground instances of a (finite) 
database; in general, this is an infinite propositional theory. Hence our results 
suggest interesting extensions of logic programming. Second, although no clear 
connection has been made to date, there is much evidence that the complexity of a 
problem restricted to finite objects is generally connected with that of the unre- 
stricted case (see, e.g., [5]); for example, a very high complexity for the problem of 
deciding minimal consequence between a theory and a sentence suggests a high 
degree of intractability for the problem of deciding minimal consequence between 
two sentences. Results on locating this latter relation in the polynomial-time 
hierarchy lie beyond the scope of this paper and will appear elsewhere. 
The authors would like to thank Alan Bundy, David Ethetington, and the referees for helpful comments 
on an earlier draft of this paper. 
REFERENCES 
1. Chang, C. C. and Keisler, H. J., Model Theov, North Holland, 1973. 
2. Davis, M., The Mathematics of Non-monotonic Reasoning, ArtiJicial Intelligence, 13 
(1980). 
3. Hinman, P. G., Recursion-Theoretic Hierarchies, Springer-Verlag, 1978. 
4. Schlipf, J. S., Decidability and Definability with Circumscription, Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 
35:173-191 (1987). 
5. Stockmeyer, L., Classifying the Computational Complexity of Problems, J. Symbolic Logic 
52(1):1-43 (1987). 
